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FOREWORD
The term “confidence-building measures” is not
new. The idea that international actors can come together to share information about their activities in
order to establish trust, prevent misunderstandings
and misperceptions and de-escalate conflicts is one
that has a long pedigree. The development of confidence-building measures in the areas of biological and
chemical warfare date back to the beginning of the
20th century. Confidence-building measures aimed at
de-escalating conflicts along the Indo-Pakistan border
date back to the 1970s.
But what do these diverse events have to offer us
as lessons as we think about confidence-building measures in cyberspace? Dr. Mary Manjikian’s insightful
analysis suggests that both territorially based and
weapons-based confidence-building measures can
provide models for the ways in which states can learn
to cooperate and share information in regard to cyberspace and cyber weapons. We can look at the drive to
eliminate biological weapons as a model for the ways
in which academics have learned to self-police their
research for national security implications, the ways
in which they socialize new members of the academic
community into the importance of considering security issues, and the ways in which they develop and
disseminate norms regarding what is and is not a
moral and ethical use of these technologies. Dr. Manjikian recommends that as we move forward as policymakers, we give thought to how academics working on cyber weapons might be similarly motivated
to think of themselves as an academic community
with norms, procedures, and safeguards. At the same
time, we can look at the example of the Indo-Pakistan
conflict to see how policymakers have been both sucv

cessful and unsuccessful in creating an environment
of relative stability through sharing information about
developments along the border with each other. The
development of hotlines, reporting requirements, and
regular meetings has helped policymakers to establish
trust among neighbors though that trust is often fragile and precarious. Here again, this historic example
might hold lessons for cyber warriors today, leading
to a regime that would include requirements to notify
other states when cyber exercises are taking place, to
seek information through a hotline before responding in kind, and to activities that bring cyber warriors
together on a regular basis to begin to establish trust
among all parties.
At the same time, however, these case studies illustrate the challenges that all sides may face in
implementing confidence-building measures. They
show what happens when not everyone in a regime
is equally committed to a specific outcome, they illustrate the difficulties of monitoring compliance in
confidence-building regimes, and they show the ways
in which doctrines and confidence-building measures
may not be perfectly aligned. Again, here we can
draw lessons—perhaps about what pitfall to avoid—
as we move toward the implementation of confidencebuilding in cyberspace.
This analysis will give readers much to consider
through providing a valuable context in thinking
through the implications of confidence-building in
cyberspace today.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This monograph examines two historic examples
of the development of confidence-building measures
(CBMs) so as to make recommendations regarding
the development of CBMs for cyberspace. The first
study looks at CBMs aimed at preventing the escalation of conflict in contested territories such as the
Indo-Pakistan border. The second study looks at the
development of a chemical weapons ban following
World War I and the establishment of reporting and
monitoring procedures to stem the proliferation of
chemical weapons. Both cases offer lessons for cyberbased CBMs: One can borrow from territorial CBMs
to establish a secure environment, or one can borrow from weapons-based CBMs to shape the development of new cyber technologies and prevent their
proliferation.
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CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN CYBERSPACE:
A COMPARISON OF TERRITORIAL AND
WEAPONS-BASED REGIMES
INTRODUCTION: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES IN HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE
As Emily Goldman and John Arquilla have recently noted, the complex and novel nature of cyber
technology often makes it difficult for laymen to understand and formulate policy in this field. For that
reason it is useful to reason by analogy in order to
describe the threats, risks, and opportunities found
in cyberspace through borrowing from and seeking
comparisons with prior conflicts.1 Thus far, of course,
the most well-known analogy is the description of the
risks facing the United States in cyberspace as a result of a surprise attack for which the United States is
unprepared to respond, leading to a so-called Cyber
Pearl Harbor.
In this analysis, I reason by analogy in presenting
two prior situations in which nations have developed
confidence-building measures (CBMs) in order to
share information and build trust in fields where technology was advancing rapidly and risks were high. In
the first case, I describe how the United States worked
with allies to bring India and Pakistan to the bargaining table in order to share information and build trust
when (physical) border tensions were high. Territorial CBMs aim to build a secure and stable predictable
environment through sharing information regarding
alleged territorial incursions. In the case of India and
Pakistan, this multi-faceted process began in 1947 and
is still ongoing, including exchanges of information
between both civilians and military personnel. Measures aimed at creating transparency about each side’s
1

activities in territory where borders were unclear, ethnic tensions were great, and the risk of preemptive
action by either side was high. If we consider how a
security dilemma in real space is addressed when it
is difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive activities, and between preemptive war and
offensive war, we can draw insights into how similar
dilemmas in cyberspace might be addressed.
In the second case, I examine CBMs in cyberspace
through considering, not territory, but instead issues
of weaponry. In this analogy, I present the lessons
from the Biological Weapons Convention, describing how the scientific-technical and defense communities in the United States worked together to create
early warning, monitoring, and verification regimes
in order to prevent biological weapons use against
civilians and in conflict. Weapons-based CBMs have
a different starting point. While territorial CBMs are
largely reactive in nature, aimed at containing or deescalating preexisting conflicts, weapons-based CBMs
are preemptive in nature, aimed at socializing weapons producers into working from an agreed-upon set
of norms that can shape (or prevent) conflicts that
might arise later. What lessons does the Biological
Weapons Convention offer cyber policymakers today? In this instance, the scientific-technical community, along with the policy community, established
a strong normative regime against the manufacture,
use, and deployment of these weapons. Similarly, the
cyber community includes both civilian and military
manufacturers, producers, and engineers; thus, there
are lessons to be learned from the epistemic community of biological weapons scientists. Here the analogy
is particularly interesting since the issues of attribution and dual-use are similar between the two types of
weapons: biological and cyber.
2

The decision as to whether current cyber CBMs
will be patterned upon territorial or weapons-based
CBMs has important implications for the development
of a state’s overall cyber foreign policy. As Myriam
Cavelty has recently argued, current analysts do not
agree about what specifically needs to be defended
in cyberspace, and they do not appear to be aware of
this distinction. However, as she notes, different securitization paradigms tend to stress different referent
objects of security.2
Thus, choosing the “right metaphor” is not merely
important from a literary perspective since the metaphor, in effect, frames the problem. Each metaphor
highlights certain aspects of a problem while downplaying others. Furthermore, certain solutions may
present themselves clearly, while other less obvious
solutions are ignored if the wrong metaphor is chosen.
As the comparative case studies in this monograph
show, an emphasis on cyberspace as a domain characterized by territorial conflict along borders leads to
the conclusion that the military is the most logical actor to take the lead in preventing cyber conflict. On
the other hand, descriptions of the weapons used, the
danger of proliferation, and the goal of preventing
an arms race do not lead to the same conclusion. Instead, an emphasis on weaponry leads to the conclusion that what is needed is export regimes, which are
usually controlled and enforced by the Department
of Justice and the Department of Commerce. Here,
the language of weapons transfers and proliferation
of cyber arms is used to describe a criminal problem
rather than a security problem for which solutions are
criminological rather than military.
In addition, the two metaphors differ in terms of
how seriously each portrays the current problem. Military actors concerned with the cyber conflict argue
3

that the United States has not devoted sufficient funds
or energy to combatting this problem, while those
concerned with cyber proliferation often feel that current controls are actually too stringent, and that, as a
result, they risk harming the competitiveness of U.S.
cyber industries on the world market. Similarly, the
two types of CBMs protect different things. Territorial CBMs protect cyber territory and objects within
that cyber territory (i.e., critical infrastructure) from
incursion. In contrast, weapons-based CBMs protect
humans and data. The major threat is one of disruption, which could affect the continuity of business interests.3 Thus, corporate interests are better protected
by weapons-based confidence-building measures, and
this has increased the “buy-in” of the private sector
into the development of CBMs in cyberspace.
In examining the utility of both types of confidencebuilding measures, it might appear that the decision
has already been made—that U.S. and international
military planners have already focused on preventing conflict in cyber territory—referring to securing
or holding, defending or maintaining one’s place in
cyberspace.4 Furthermore, new U.S. and international
initiatives to apply the law of armed conflict (LOAC)
to events that occur in cyberspace—including borrowing definitions for what it means to launch a preemptive attack or an unprovoked attack, or to violate another state’s sovereignty5—clearly define cyberspace
and CBMs in cyberspace with reference to territory.
However, one can also find reference to combatting
the proliferation of cyber weapons, of establishing an
international scientific and professional community
that would share a consensus about the proper development and use of cyber weapons, and to the ways in
which cyber weapons might be codified or modified in
order to distinguish between offensive and defensive
4

cyber weapons. The cyber weapons discourse (versus
the cyber territory discourse) more clearly acknowledges the role of nonstate actors in describing cyber
weapons as an asymmetric threat, since they can be
deployed easily and cheaply by both state and nonstate actors alike.6
Figure 1 shows how both types of measures have
been proposed for cyberspace.
In point of fact, future CBM provisions for cyber
conflict may end up most closely resembling the international arms control regime for nuclear weapons. In
that set of protocols, there are both provisions aimed
at affecting the activities of scientists who engage in
research and development in this area (such as mandating that they carry security clearances and receive
proper training on the legislative and ethical restrictions that surround the production and use of these
weapons) as well as provisions that describe the ways
in which leaders and their teams should react in a crisis situation where nuclear use is suspected. In the first
instance, provisions resemble those implemented for
weapons-based CBMs, while in the second instance,
they resemble provisions implemented for territorial-type CBMs. A further unpacking of both types of
CBMs will help to make this point clear.
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Territorial CBM's

Weapons-Based CBM'S

Modeled Upon

• Indo-Pakistan Confidence-Building Measures
• Korean Peninsula Confidence-Building
measures
• Maritime Confidence-Building measures,
South China Sea

• United Nations Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (1975)
• United Nations Chemical Weapons
Convention (1997)
• Australia Group

Actors Involved

• U.S. Cybercommand
• Organization on Security and Cooperation in
Europe
• European Union
• Shanghai Cooperation Organization
• International Telecommunications Union
• Intelligence Community

• United Nations Office of Disarmament and Arms Control
• U.S. Department of Commerce
• U.S. Department of Justice
• Intelligence Community
• Nongovernmental Organizations

Values

• Stability within territory
• Predictability

• Transparency

Desired End State

• Agreement on Definitions
• Application of International law
• End misperception, spiral of conflict

•
•
•
•

Key Events

Establishment of U.S.-Russian hotline

Wassenaar Arrangement

Proposed Measures

•
•
•
•

Limited Force Deployment zones
List of prohibited targets
Hotlines
Advance notification regimes

• Export License Regimes
• Verification and Monitoring
Regimes
• Classification scheme for cyber
weapons

Violations Addressed

•
•
•
•

Cybertrespass
Dedicated Denial of Service Attacks
Cyberespionage
Preemptive strikes

• Weaponization of code (Malware)
• Encryption Issues

How Addressed

International Courts

Domestically through Department
of Justice

Current Issues

• Active Defense doctrine incompatible with
CBMs?
• Is private sector on-board?

• W
 hite House lacks commitment
to Transparency regarding vulnerabilities
• Domestic commitment to making
necessary changes in tracking,
reporting, prosecuting cyber
developments?

De-escalation of arms raise
End of proliferation
Weapons Ban
Policing by epistemic community

Figure 1. A Comparison of Territorial
and Weapons Based Confidence-Building Measures
for Cyberspace.
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CASE STUDY 1: CYBERSPACE AS TERRITORY
Prospects for Applying Territorially Based
Confidence-Building Measures.
The application of a territorial metaphor to describe cyberspace is almost as old as cyberspace itself.7
The language of territoriality can indeed be traced all
the way back to the original architects of cyberspace.
We can, for example, consider John Perry Barlow’s
“Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace,” which
referred to the Internet as a “global social space.”
While Barlow referred to cyberspace as a sort of global
commons, which was unowned and ungoverned,8 by
2003, the U.S. National Security Strategy described the
concept of “American cyberspace,” taking for granted
the notion that cyberspace (or cyber territory) could
be both controlled and owned by a particular national
entity, and that incursions into a nation’s cyber territory could be seen as a threat that required the development of both defensive and offensive strategies in
response. Here the U.S. military in particular has been
a key actor in putting forth a narrative in which cyberspace is to be treated as territory and as a domain
for warfare similar to other domains such as air, land,
sea, and space.9 The 2007 Shanghai Cooperation Organization Action Plan (to which China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are
signatories) similarly includes language that stresses
that each partner maintains national control over its
own Internet.10
However, despite emerging understandings that
cyber territory was sovereign and should be governed
autonomously, we can also trace the expression of
sentiments in favor of developing some international
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norms regarding state conduct in cyberspace based on
the assumption that it was a commons, dating back
as early as 2003. In that year, Richard Clarke, a former Special Advisor to the President for Cybersecurity, stated that “having some effective limits on what
nations actually do with their cyber war knowledge
might, given our asymmetrical vulnerabilities, be in
the U.S. national interest.”11 More recently, in a report
to the Council on Foreign Relations, former Director
of National Intelligence John Negroponte has described the need for a “digital foreign policy,” which
would include having the United States work with international organizations like the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to make cyberspace less
divided, chaotic, and anarchic.12
However, because the borders of territories in cyberspace are often amorphous and because consensus
often does not exist regarding where one country’s cyberspace begins and another’s ends, policymakers can
borrow ideas about containing and preempting conflict in cyberspace from the field of territorial CBMs.
In both real territory and in cyber territory,13 one can
consider the fact that territories may not be tightly
controlled at every point, and that, as a result, vulnerabilities or weaknesses in defense may occur. Abraham Sofaer, David Clark, and Whitfield Diffie refer to
such weaknesses or vulnerabilities as sources of cyber
insecurity, noting that they may result from flaws and
weaknesses in both hardware and software.14 In particular, we might look to the measures that states have
created to attempt to contain and de-escalate conflicts
that occur about territorial disputes in areas where
borders are amorphous or unclear, such as in maritime areas or in outer space.
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In this analysis, I consider the ways in which confidence-building measures have been developed and
deployed in preventing border disputes from escalating along the Indo-Pakistan border. In later works,
one might also wish to examine confidence-building
measures that exist for preventing misunderstandings
from occurring in maritime areas.
Defining Territorially Based
Confidence-Building Measures.
In considering the use of confidence-building measures in relation to territorial disputes, CBMs are described as measures taken to enable the threshold of
animosity between two adversarial nations in order
to lower the degree of mutual distrust.15 A. Z. Hilali
describes confidence-building measures as:
Practical actions aimed at creating attitudes of cooperation; instruments for the prevention of war and
conflict and for the resolution of existing conflicts
between regional neighbors or parties to the kind of
long-standing confrontation, exemplified by the cold
war, in which normal channels of communication are
weak or have broken down.16

Anne Finger and Oliver Meier describe them as
an interim step that is less legally binding than a formal agreement that might come later.17 As an interim
step, CBMs do not therefore seek to solve or eliminate
the security dilemma. Their chief “product” is thus
often not legislation but dialogue, and the process is
as important as the end product. Confidence-building
measures bring adversaries to the table and engage
them in conversations in order to decrease mistrust
and create common grounds for future agreements.18
9

Territorial CBMs are often bilateral and may occur between nations that have a long-standing adversarial
relationship due to nationalist disagreements; religious, ideological or cultural disagreements; or simply
historical events.
In the case of India and Pakistan, the Indian subcontinent was subdivided in 1947 through the establishment of the so-called Radcliffe Line.19 After Mahatma
Gandhi’s successful movement for Indian independence, the British withdrew from the region, and new
territorial lines were drawn that separated majority
Muslim regions from majority Hindu regions. The
British withdrawal represented the end of rule by a
powerful outside entity with the strength to prevent
interethnic conflicts by means of force. Instead, the territorial inhabitants were forced to come to an uneasy
truce in a region where borders were new rather than
historic, artificially imposed on the region and prone
to instability and conflict.20 Furthermore, there was no
regional hegemon able to enforce a truce.

Map 1. The Partition of India and Pakistan, 1947.
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Here the parallel with cyberspace is clear. Since the
early-1970s when the Internet was a utility developed
by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
for use only by U.S. military personnel, the “land” of
the Internet has become a sort of global territory, accessible to all, where the borders are unclear and subject to change. Furthermore, over time, international
actors such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers have helped to “partition” the
Internet through assigning national addresses to
various territories or neighborhoods on the Internet.
However, as is the case with India and Pakistan, these
territorial divisions are clearly artificial, imposed by
an outside actor and subject to change. As is the case
with India and Pakistan, border clashes and incursions
have quickly become a problem requiring solutions in
order to prevent a spiral of escalation and violence.
Territorial confidence-building measures rest on
the realist assumption that the international system is
anarchic, that states act to preserve their own interests, and that in an anarchic system where cooperation
is not the rule but the exception, the conditions are set
for a security dilemma and a spiral of misperception.
States agreeing to confidence-building measures do
not do so, therefore, out of an innate desire to cooperate with their neighbors but rather because they rationally have decided that opting out of confidencebuilding measures presents a greater threat to their
own survival and state security.
Here the threat that each seeks to defuse is not only
that player A might misunderstand the activities and
intentions of player B, but also that both players might
misunderstand the activities of some third party (such
as a nonstate actor or civilian) who enters the territory
and begins to carry out activities. In descriptions of
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maritime agreements in the South China Sea, parties
to the treaty have voiced concerns that local fisherman
might accidentally traverse a boundary as they pursue
a school of fish,21 while officials concerned with cyber
trespass have voiced concerns over a scenario where
private sector commercial actors might “attack back,”
targeting computer equipment in a foreign territory
in retaliation for attacks against their own systems.22
In each case, if tensions are already high, such actions
easily could be misinterpreted as being sanctioned by
state actors.
The specific confidence-building measures adopted between India and Pakistan that have relevance to
the diffusion of territorial disputes in cyberspace include the 1987 decision establishing a hotline between
political or military leaders of both nations so that in
a perceived territorial incursion situation, information
can be quickly shared and the situation de-escalated.
In addition, in 1988, both parties jointly established a
list of facilities that would be off limits for targeting
in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, including
nuclear facilities. Finally, in 1991, both sides agreed
to institute an advance notice requirement regarding
the conduct of military exercises along a border or in a
border region so that such exercises are not perceived
as a military advance.
Figure 2 illustrates the range of military confidence-building measures that have been undertaken
in seeking to prevent violence and misunderstandings between India and Pakistan, as well as the
events that have occurred that set back confidencebuilding measures over that time frame.

12

Timeline: Confidence-Building Measures in Indo-Pakistan Conflict
1947: First Kashmir War
1948: UN negotiates ceasefire, which went into effect in 1949.
1965: War between India and Pakistan ended through Tashkent Declaration (involvement of Soviet Union in peace talks). Both sides agreed
to a policy of noninterference in the affairs of each other.
1971: War between India and Pakistan, settled by 1972 Simla Agreement.
Both sides agreed not to use force to settle their disputes. Both
sides agreed to a bilateral dialogue process for dispute resolution.
1987: Establishment of hotline between Indian and Pakistani Prime
Ministers.
1988: First nuclear CBM: agreement not to attack one another’s nuclear
facilities (ratified 1991, implemented 1992). Agreement to exchange
lists of nuclear facilities.
1990: Establishment of a direct communications link between both nations’ Directors General of Military Operations, agreement for weekly
discussions via the hotline.
1991: Agreement to inform the other side prior to conducting military exercises involving two or more armed divisions in specific areas.
1991: Agreement on non-violation of air space: Neither side’s fighter
aircraft can enter within 10 kilometers of foreign space.
1992: Accord on prevention of chemical weapons: both sides agreed not to
produce, develop or acquire chemical weapons.

Figure 2. A Timeline of CBMs
in the Indo-Pakistan Conflict.
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1994: Breakdown of talks after India alleged that Pakistan had sponsored
terrorism in India.
1997: Resumption of Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan.
1999: Kargil War, followed by Lahore Declaration: Agreement to upgrade
military hotline
2000: Failed Agra Summit.
2001: Attack on India’s Parliament, mobilization of troops along border.
2003: Ceasefire between India and Pakistan.
2004: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Summit, Islamabad.
Pakistan’s prime minster assures India that he will not support terrorism against India.
2008: Standoff between two nations related to 2008 Mumbai attacks.
2011: India-Pakistan border shooting.
January 2013: Suspension of Composite Dialogue Process.

Source: Information is From Smruti Pattanaik and Arpita Anant, “Cross-LoC Confidence Building Measures between India
and Pakistan: A Giant Leap or a Small Step towards Peace?”
New Delhi, India: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses,
February 12, 2010, available from www.idsa.in/issuebrief/CrossLoCCBMbetweenIndiaandPakistan_120210, accessed May 12, 2014.
Other sources consulted include T. Najmudheen and Farhana
Kausar, “Importance of Confidence Building Measures in IndiaPakistan Relationships: A South Asian Perspective,” Asia-Pacific
Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2013, pp. 61-91.

Figure 2. A Timeline of CBMs in the Indo-Pakistan
Conflict. (cont.)
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Evaluating the Effectiveness of Territorially Based
Confidence-Building Measures.
As is obvious from this timeline, CBMs alone have
not succeeded in ending all conflicts and territorial
clashes, or in assuring that there is no outbreak of
violence. Instead, there have been violent outbreaks
and a breakdown of confidence-building measures in
1965, 1971, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2001, and most recently in
2013. Historians describe India and Pakistan as having fought three major wars and one undeclared war.
In each case, it has taken the actions of the international community to bring both players back to the
negotiating table.
For this reason, analysts disagree about the longterm effects of confidence-building measures. Hilali
describes the goal of confidence-building measures
as “the gradual creation of an atmosphere of mutual
trust, transparency and predictability in slow and incremental steps.”23 Indeed, confidence-building measures in the Indo-Pakistan area include reciprocal visits and exchanges between military experts within a
field of expertise, cooperation on related issues (such
as oil spills or fishing rights in the maritime environment), and shared emergency-response procedures
(to respond to events like humanitarian disasters). Nations may also cooperate in carrying out activities like
mapping and surveying the territory or responding to
the activities of third parties like terrorists or pirates.
Others, however, suggest that territorial CBMs are by
nature fragile, and that they represent a “least worst
option” for diffusing conflict in a region, but that they
are not likely to alter the relationship between adversaries over the long term.24 In considering events

15

in India and Pakistan, P. K. Ghosh suggests that no
real progress has occurred in terms of increasing trust
between the two nations.25 Rather, the fact that such
extremely detailed agreements between the two nations are still needed (i.e., a prohibition on “buzzing”
each other’s ships with aircraft in the maritime environment) is evidence not of how far the two nations
have come, but rather of the tensions that still exist
and must be carefully managed.
In addition, nations agreeing to subject themselves
to territorial confidence-building measures risk giving up some measure of national sovereignty, since
agreements tend to be multinational and to be carried
out under the auspices of international organizations
like the United Nations (UN). Definitions and ethical
standards for determining whether or not a territorial
incursion has occurred are thus drawn from customary international law, including the Law on Armed
Conflict, rather than from national understandings.
In evaluating the utility of territorially based confidence-building measures, it is useful to consider the
so-called “Atlantique Incident,” in which a Pakistani
naval aircraft was downed by an Indian MIG-22 on
August 10, 1999. All 16 people on board were killed.
India’s government alleged that the Pakistani plane
had violated Indian airspace and that the Pakistani
military failed to warn India of its intent to fly near the
border, which is in violation of the 1991 agreement, and
alleged that it had been a spying mission. Pakistan, in
response, claimed that the aircraft had made an honest
mistake and strayed accidentally into India’s territory.
The Atlantique Incident is widely considered a failure of confidence-building measures. Procedures like
a hotline were in place to prevent misunderstandings
of this type, but they were not utilized. The incident
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occurred quickly, and it was unclear to what degree
the two Indian MIG pilots had acted on their own initiative in shooting down the plane or whether they
had been instructed to do so by authorities within the
military. This incident calls into question how effective
procedures for addressing conflicts ultimately may be
when tensions are high and decisions are being made
quickly. Hilali argues that this incident occurred, at
least in part, because neither side was truly committed
to utilizing procedures for addressing and minimizing conflicts, and because neither side actually trusted
the other, despite the existence of decades of attempts
at cooperation.26
Prospects for Success or Failure of
Territorially Based Confidence-Building
Measures in Cyberspace.
Many key CBM provisions for cyberspace are
closely patterned upon existing territorial confidencebuilding measures. Like other types of territorial
confidence-building measures, confidence-building
measures in cyber territory are being established and
carried out by international organizations. Currently,
the ITU is involved in building confidence and security in the use of information and communications
technologies.27 At the same time, the Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation
has proposed the creation of an international agency
with regulatory authority that would be responsible
for creating and administering an international treaty
to deal with cybersecurity.28
In establishing a secure, stable, and predictable
environment in cyberspace, leaders have taken steps
to provide advance notice and share information
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regarding activities like military exercises in cyberspace. Richard Clarke and Robert Knake have called
for the creation of a treaty modeled upon the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), established to
regulate the creation, stockpiling, and deployment of
nuclear arms between the United States and the Soviet Union. Clarke and Kane’s “cyber war limitation
treaty” would include the creation of a risk reduction center, which would act to diffuse crisis situations, coordinate with the UN, exchange information,
and work with nations to establish international law
concepts.29
In addition, the United States and Russia have
established several procedures for sharing information in crisis situations to prevent escalation. This includes the establishment of a White House-Kremlin
hotline as part of a bilateral agreement on information
and communications technology security. This same
agreement also calls for creating a U.S.-Russian Cyber
Working Group, as well as establishing links between
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) in
both countries.30
In considering the evolution of confidence-building activities between India and Pakistan in reference
to their border regions, it is clear that issues between
India and Pakistan increasingly have concerned the
actions of nonstate actors. In several cases, crossborder violent activities have occurred, creating situations where it was difficult for participants and the
international community to assign responsibility definitively to a particular state. In particular, India has
alleged that terrorists and insurgents acting in India
in actuality have been sponsored by Pakistan. The activities of nonstate actors and the attribution problem
thus constrain the effectiveness of confidence-building
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measures of a territorial nature, whether in material
territory or in cyber territory.
In addition, the Atlantique Incident shows how
military doctrines regarding response to an incursion
clash with military-diplomatic agreements regarding conflict prevention. Here, the philosophy behind
confidence-building measures was not translated into
tactical guidance given to warfighters on the ground
or in the air. Similarly, doctrines like active defense
in cyberspace are at odds with confidence-building
measures in cyberspace as they are currently specified. As David Rickards of the U.S. Naval War College
points out, there exist significant doctrinal gaps in the
guidance that commanders and warfighters receive
regarding how they should respond during situations
of cyber attack when they may have only limited communications infrastructure.31
Dorothy Denning and Bradley Strawser describe
two types of active cyber defense that might be problematic in this regard. First, they describe blocking as
“akin to a missile defense system that shoots down
incoming missiles or jams their radars and seekers.”
Secondly, they describe pre-emption as “like launching an offensive strike against the air or ground platform launching the missiles.”32 Both tactics require an
immediate response and may require acting in a situation of incomplete information. Because of the rapid
speed at which cyber warfare occurs, active defense
may also include provisions to pre-delegate authority to carry out defensive actions to cyber warfighters,
or even to create conditions in which machines might
respond autonomously to perceived attacks without
waiting for or even seeking permission. In such a situation, it is difficult to see how confidence-building
measures such as the creation of a crisis hotline would
be effective in preventing escalation or preventing
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misunderstandings.33 (As Rickards points out, there
have been few opportunities to thoroughly test the
effectiveness—and the problems—of these doctrines
under real world combat conditions, since there has
not yet been a full-scale cyber war.)34
Denning and Strawser also describe “noncooperative defenses,” including so-called “hack backs,”
which may include a defender responding with an initiative that attempts to get the attacker to install spyware on his system.35 Here, the hack-backer is often
a civilian working in the computer security industry,
and it is unclear what legal status such activities may
have under a confidence-building measures agreement. Further, such countermeasures might be categorized as spying or covert activities that would be at
odds with the values of transparency and trust, which
are at the heart of confidence-building measures.
Thus, in order for confidence-building measures
in cyberspace to be truly effective in addressing the
security dilemma and decreasing the risk of escalation, CBMs aimed at increasing transparency (like
advance notification regimes) would also need to be
supplemented by more far-reaching CBMs that directly constrain military actors by requiring them to work
with other states’ parties to discuss and agree upon
military doctrines. (Such CBMs have, in fact, been undertaken in the field of nuclear conflict.36) In addition,
it would be advisable for partners to a CBM agreement to consent to a list of facilities that would not be
targeted during a cyber war, to include so-called supervisory control and data acquisition systems, those
which run industrial processes, from power plants to
electrical grids.
It would also be useful for all players to come together to discuss, and possibly even to agree upon, particular doctrines that would be utilized by all sides in
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a conflict, as well as doctrines that would be regarded
as unethical, unlawful, or immoral by all sides. Here
again, there is precedent for such a discussion since
these types of conversations took place among parties
to arms control agreements in the field of nuclear war
during the 1970s. The aim here would be to develop a
shared vocabulary and set of understandings regarding doctrinal developments in the field of cyber warfare so that all parties had the same understanding
of concepts such as cyber deterrence and preemptive
cyber warfare.37
As this short case study illustrates, there are several lessons that those interested in creating confidencebuilding measures in cyberspace might thus draw
from the historical example of territorially based confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan. Figure 3 spells out a few of these lessons.
Lessons Derived from Indo-Pakistan Confidence-Building Measures
As the example of the over 50-year process of establishing confidence-building measures between Pakistan and India shows:
1. The creation of confidence-building measures to mitigate territorial disputes and tensions is a very long process characterized by periods of relative
success alternating with situations that clearly show the failures and limits of
these agreements.
2. Norms do not always develop over time nor is trust always created.
3. Nonstate actors and the problem of attribution complicate the situation.
Military doctrine and tactics may be at odds with the philosophy of confidence building.
4. Territorial confidence-building measures do not occur in isolation: India
and Pakistan were forced to cooperate on key issues such as water rights

Figure 3. Lessons Learned from Indo-Pakistan
CBMs.
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and shared resources. This helped to establish the likelihood that they would
also address their military conflicts. Similarly, policies regarding the regulation of territorial conflicts and incursions in cyberspace will be developed
and implemented in a broader diplomatic environment where other issues
between states may complicate the carrying out of cyberspace CBM’s. Here
we may consider the fact that Russia’s territorial incursions into “real space”
in the Crimea are occurring simultaneously with suspected cyber incursions
into the same territory.*
5. It is easier to establish territorial confidence-building measures when both
nations are stable and subject to regularized elections and turnover in office.
Domestic political instability in both India and Pakistan made it more difficult
to establish long-term territorial CBM’s.
6. The media plays a role in sensationalizing claims that do occur. During
the Atlantique incident, tensions flared as leaders in both nations utilized the
media to put forth their version of events. Again, events do not occur only at
the diplomatic or military level or in isolation from the rest of society.
* For more on point 4, see Jason Rivera: “Has Russia Begun Offensive Cyberspace Operations in Crimea?” Georgetown Security
Studies Review Blog, March 2, 2014, available from georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2014/03/02/has-russia-begun-offensive-cyberspace-operations-in-crimea, accessed on May 12, 2014.

Figure 3. Lessons Learned from Indo-Pakistan
CBMs. (cont.)
CASE STUDY 2: BIOWEAPONS
Prospects for Applying Weapons-Based
Confidence-Building Measures to Cyberspace.
Although the predominant model that policymakers have used to think about confidence-building measures in relation to cyber is that of territorial CBMs, there
have also been limited attempts to utilize a weaponsbased CBM model. In particular, Marietje Schaake, a
Dutch member of the European Parliament, has been
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active in an effort called “Stop the Digital Arms Race.”
She has called upon European Union members to give
the European Commission a mandate to draft legislation and pursue initiatives leading to a weapons ban
on the use of “digital arms.”38 In addition, within the
European community, some initiatives aimed at combatting cyber crime actually appear to resemble cyber
weapons bans or nonproliferation initiatives for cyber
weapons. In particular, the 2001 Council of European
Convention on Cybercrime attempted to criminalize
the “production, sale, procurement, and distribution
of devices, including computer programs designed or
adapted primary for the purposes of committing offenses such as illegal access, illegal interception and
data interference.”39 This same agreement also established regular consultation groups that would bring
together parties to share information on significant
legal, policy, and technological developments related
to cyber crime.
In addition, in the past year, a number of Western
nations have taken steps to address problems of weapons transfers of digital arms and the problem of cyber
weapons proliferation. In May 2014, the Wassenaar
Arrangement, an export license agreement signed by
41 nations and originally established to track the production of components used in the manufacture and
production of biological and chemical weapons, was
amended to include new provisions requiring states’
parties to track and regulate what types of software
code was being exported through sales to clients
abroad. This development was due in large part to
recent revelations showing that the German program
FinFisher, used by law enforcement to “snoop” on the
transactions and files of those suspected of engagement in criminal activity, had been exported to many
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authoritarian regimes that were using the program
to spy on their own citizens. The official response to
the FinFisher revelations from both the United States
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development was to condemn the company for having violated guidelines on the export of this product.40
However, academic computer scientists were equally
shocked, with many expressing a desire to work together with law enforcement and other agencies to
ensure that their work was not used against citizens in
this way. The Wassenaar arrangement includes controls on zero days and other types of intrusion and
surveillance software.
However, critics have pointed to shortcomings
with this development. Jennifer Granick argues that
the challenge will be in defining which types of vulnerabilities should be placed on this list, voicing the
concern that defining the class of restricted tools too
tightly would hamper the ability of academics and
private sector security consultants to conduct research in the area of computer security. There is also
a concern that in making one class of cyber weapons
components more difficult to procure, those wishing
to manufacture such weapons will simply move on
to the creation of different weapons.41 Furthermore,
this international agreement, even if effective, will do
nothing to stem the problem of nonstate actors who
might seek to acquire or utilize these components.
Finally, as Granick points out, the agreement is not
legally binding (that is, it does not have the same legal status as a treaty), and it will be up to each state
individually to undertake the creation of domestic legal and administrative procedures in support of the
agreement. The ability of states to do so may depend
on domestic political and economic factors, as well as
the overall level of development of each state.
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The FinFisher incident and the subsequent adoption of the Wassenaar arrangement, however, is a
powerful illustration of the role which technical specialists and civilians play in the creation of CBMs for
cyber weapons. The cyber weapons community consists of government officials, including military members and civilians, including those with commercial
interests in the sector, as well as academic scientists
who may be involved in developing innovative new
weapons technologies. In carrying out confidencebuilding measures, government officials need to work
with commercial and academic actors, being careful to
respect the interests of all players and seeking to influence and guide developments without being seen as
seeking to control that process unduly. As President
Barack Obama wrote in his 60-day review of cybersecurity operations in February 2009, “the private sector
designs, builds, owns and operates most of the digital
infrastructure.”42
In implementing the Wassenaar Arrangement,
the United States will task the Department of Commerce with issuing export-licenses for software. Code
is thus regarded not as a military munition subject to
military regulation, but rather as a commercial good
subject to commercial regulation. Similarly, unauthorized trafficking in this commercial good is regarded
as a criminal matter, rather than a security matter. In
this situation, the locus of authority has changed, with
the Department of Defense (DoD) taking a backseat
to other federal agencies involved in regulating cyber
weapons. The lessened role for DoD is not surprising
here, since as Deibert suggests, a new model of CBMs
that involves practitioners and civil society in describing conditions of use for cyber weapons, and developing norms for their use represents a break with traditional realist cyber strategies.43
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The Wassenaar example is instructive because it
illustrates the ways in which norms governing the
proper role and use of both offensive and defensive
cyber weapons can, in point of fact, emerge organically through the contacts and cooperation that will take
place between practitioners. Thus, while territorially
based CBMs attempt to create norms regarding proper
conduct in cyberspace, which are then imposed upon
participants in a top-down pattern, the example of the
Wassenaar arrangement shows how policymakers can
perhaps create the conditions for practitioners to have
a stake in developing these norms and taking responsibility for the sorts of weapons that are developed
and deployed. As the adoption of the Wassenaar arrangement shows, technical specialists who produce
cyber weapons have their own strong normative ethos
regarding the situations in which it would be proper
and improper to deploy such weapons, and they are
willing to invest in procedures to secure these cyber
weapons.44 In this way, they resemble the medical
personnel who decided in the early-20th century that
contributing to the production and stockpiling of biological or chemical weapons was against their ethos as
a medical community, which should be committed to
healing patients, not harming civilians.45
Because bioweapons and cyber share so much
common ground in terms of challenges to detection,
verification, and monitoring, it makes sense to consider both whether the same CBMs can be used in both
instances and how effective those CBMs are. As Figure 4 shows, there are many similarities between the
two weapons classes in terms of their possible uses, as
well as issues for monitoring and verification. However, there are less similarities when it comes to the
existence of an international consensus or set of norms
regarding their possible use.
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As this figure illustrates, biological and chemical
weapons share common ground with cyber weapons
in terms of their utility, cost, and likelihood of deployment. As Gregory Koblenz notes, in a biological
weapons conflict, the individual who attacks first has
the advantage, as these weapons have greatest utility
when they are used in an offensive capacity. In addition, as with cyber weapons, these weapons may
have great utility when used as a force multiplier
for conventional weapons deterrent strategies.46 Biological weapons, like cyber weapons, also confer the
advantage that, unlike kinetic attacks, they do not
destroy their target. Finally, both types of weapons
can be used to disrupt a society in order to then carry
out activity using conventional weapons. In the cyber
realm, General Keith Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency, has referred to cyber weapons
as useful for carrying out Phase Zero operations such
as wiping out an opponent’s communications infrastructure prior to launching a conventional attack.47
Like cyber weapons, biological weapons do not
work well in a deterrent capacity. As Koblenz points
out, the uncertainties associated with deployment of
biological weapons as well as the fact that they can
be manufactured largely in secret means that they do
not work well to threaten one’s opponents.48 In addition, those who do manufacture these weapons are
not likely to broadcast their particular characteristics
since to do so risks losing one’s advantage in research
and development. Thus, they are a powerful secret
weapon but not a powerful deterrent.
Like biological and chemical weapons, cyber
weapons can be produced relatively cheaply in large
quantities, often without a large risk of detection.
Biological weapons can be manufactured through
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the assembly of parts that are easy to find and readily available and the risk of detection is low (as with
cyber weapons). As Theodore Karasik notes, the components used to manufacture biological and chemical
weapons can be found at airports, farms and garden
supply warehouses, college laboratories, barge terminals, electronics plant manufacturers and storage
areas, glass and mirror plants, pipelines and propane
storage tanks.49
Because it is possible to manufacture both biological/chemical weapons and cyber weapons without
investing in infrastructure like a factory or processing
plant, there is also not a lot of lead time from when one
makes a decision to engage in their manufacture to
when one’s production facility is operational. Weapons of this type are thus cheap, easily deployable, and
offer a great deal of flexibility to their developers.
Biological and cyber weapons also both present a
“dual use dilemma.” In the case of biological weapons,
Filippa Lentzos describes the fact that the 1975 Convention of Biological Weapons and Toxins explicitly
outlaws measures “that enhance the virulence, toxicity or antibiotic resistance of pathogens (including
through the use of genetic engineering), synthetic production of toxins and examining biological aerosols.”
However, he points out, in 2000, DoD researchers
engaged in research into weaponized anthrax for the
purposes of developing better vaccines for soldiers.
As he notes, the main factor separating out the use of
biological weapons for research purposes from the use
of biological weapons for warfare purposes is simply
that of intent.50 In actuality, the two types of activities
look very much the same to an observer. Similarly, researchers attempting to perfect defenses against cyber
weapons often engage in activities, including hacking,
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which look very similar to attempts to carry out cyber
warfare. In addition, defending against both biological and cyber weapons can be extremely costly. A state
can easily expend vast resources in vaccinating civilians and military specialists against suspected pathogens, and a government agency or commercial facility
can easily spend millions or even billions of dollars to
create and update software and hardware procedures
to defend against suspected computer viruses.
Like cyber weapons, biological and chemical weapons also come with an attribution problem. They seldom possess any sort of unique signature that would
make it possible for them to be traced back to a particular manufacturing plant, individual or group.51
Like cyber weapons, there are no incriminating waste
products produced in their manufacture as there is in
the manufacture of nuclear weapons, for example.52
Because it is often so difficult to prove that a state
(or nonstate actor) has actually engaged in the manufacture or production of these types of weapons, it is
possible to argue that the sorts of regimes utilized to
monitor and verify claims about their production are
not particularly useful. Indeed, in all of the recent legal cases that have been undertaken in which it was
suspected that a state had indeed produced and even
deployed these weapons, the bulk of the evidence did
not come from international monitoring agencies or
even law enforcement, but rather from intelligence reports gathered covertly. That is, monitoring regimes
are what one utilizes “in theory,” but in point of fact,
intelligence is far more useful for gathering information about the deployment and use of these types of
weapons.53
In addition, biological and chemical weapons offer the advantage that they (like cyber weapons) can
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be used to conduct zero-day exploits. In both situations, it is possible for a weapon to deploy without the
target even knowing that it is under attack. Observers may not perceive that an attack is ongoing, and it
may only be in retrospect that a target even becomes
aware that an attack has occurred. Here we can draw a
parallel between the epidemic of food poisonings that
occurred in the western United States that were later
determined to be a type of bacterial warfare attack carried out by the religious cult, the Rajneeshis, and the
Stuxnet attacks on uranium processing and production facilities carried out in Iran. In both cases, targets
were not aware that the attacks were occurring, and,
even in retrospect, there were questions about attribution and the timing of attacks.
Finally, both biological warfare and cyber warfare,
like nuclear war, present the possibility of doing such
long-term worldwide damage that the results might be
world-ending or apocalyptic.54 Cyber warfare might
include elements like an electromagnetic pulse, which
could destroy all modern communications, while deployment of biological agents could damage the gene
pool for generations to come. In this way, one can argue that cyber warfare spirals also present a risk of
mutually assured destruction, similar to the risk that
many argue was the best reason why nuclear arms risk
reduction talks were successful in preventing nuclear
war. In this way, both biological/chemical and cyber
weapons confer an advantage to the attacker, and they
appear to elude simple solutions such as prosecuting
those who engage in them. For that reason, the emphasis needs to be on preventing the manufacture of
these weapons, rather than merely responding to their
deployment once it occurs.
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Figure 5 provides a timeline of the steps taken
to implement confidence-building measures for biological weapons. As the figure shows, the history and
timeline for establishing weapons-based CBMs differs somewhat from the history and the timeline for
establishing territory-based CBMs described earlier.
This is largely because the term “confidence-building
measures” itself means something different within
the context of a weapons ban. While territory-based
confidence-building measures aim to create transparency and information sharing procedures in order to
mitigate conflict and create a stable environment, the
weapons-based confidence-building measures described here are aimed instead at enforcing a ban on
or controlling the production, stockpiling, and use of
these weapons through creating measures for sharing
information and allowing verification so that all parties to the treaty adhere to the regime and so that those
who do not comply with the regime are punished.
Timeline of Activities Associated with Confidence-Building Measures for
Biological Weapons
1925: Passage of Geneva Protocol prohibiting use of biological and chemical
weapons (but not their manufacture or stockpiling).
1942: United States establishes a biological weapons program at
Ft. Detrick, MD.
1969: United Kingdom and Warsaw Pact introduce proposals to UN for a
ban on biological and chemical weapons.
1970: United States renounces its biological warfare program.

Figure 5. Confidence-Building Measures for
Biological Weapons.
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1972: UN creates Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
1975: Treaty enters into force with 46 signatories.
1979:Anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk, Russia widely believed to have
occurred due to experimentation with biological weapons. Soviets
denied engaging in biological weapons research until 1992 when they
officially acknowledged their programs.
1980’s:Iraqi President Saddam Hussein launches an aggressive biological
weapons program.
1984: France and China join convention.
1984: Rajneeshis Cult in Oregon is accused of engaging in biological warfare
through poisoning salad bars in the United States.
1991: In the aftermath of Gulf War, UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)
conducts inspections of facilities in Iraq suspected of carrying out
production of biological and chemical weapons.
1992: In order to become a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention, Russia shared with the United States and United Kingdom its
draft declaration on past and present biological weapons activities,
including admitting having maintained an offensive biological warfare
program from 1946 to March 1992 – though it claimed it was only in
the prototype stage.
1994: Creation of Ad Hoc Group of States’ Parties in an attempt to negotiate more legally binding verification regime for biological weapons
convention.
1999: Beginning of development of codes of ethical conduct for scientists
working in the field of biological weapons with statement by British
Medical Association.

Figure 5. Confidence-Building Measures for
Biological Weapons. (cont.)
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2001: U.S. Capitol is shut down due to anthrax mailed to Congress people,
journalists and others in the United States.
UN fails to reach agreement on a verification protocol for Biological
and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC).
United States rejects verification protocol and proposes new
changes to strengthen the BTWC, including the creation of a universal code of ethical conduct for bioscientists.
2013: U.S. Capitol receives envelopes containing ricin, a poison, in the
mail.
2014: Today, there are 163 signatories to this treaty. However, many
states do not submit the required annual reports or submit reports
that are insufficient.

Figure 5. Confidence-Building Measures for
Biological Weapons. (cont.)

The Development of Weapons-Based ConfidenceBuilding Measures.
In examining the growth of confidence-building
measures aimed at banning biological weapons worldwide, it is necessary to acknowledge the importance
of a precipitating event—namely the deployment of
chemical and biological weapons during World War
I—which led to the establishment of a normative consensus against the use of both chemical and biological
weapons. In regards to biological weapons, the German government was accused of attempting to poison
and infect British livestock, as well as of stockpiling
plague with the intent of poisoning Russian citizens
and weakening their resistance.
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In the aftermath of World War I, both biological
and chemical weapons were regarded as problematic since they failed to distinguish between military
and civilian personnel and were indeed most efficient
when deployed against major population centers, often through the use of airplanes.55 In the aftermath
of World War I, there was thus a strong public outcry against the continued use of these weapons, and
strong public support for measures that would ban
their use in future wars. This led to the adoption of
the 1925 Geneva Protocol. However, even before 1925,
there existed strong taboos against the use of chemical and biological weapons. Some historians point all
the way back to writing in the Greek city-states, which
suggested that the use of poison was duplicitous and
cowardly and, even then, seen to violate the laws of
war. Margaret Hallissy notes that “the poisoner” was
seen as using his “superior secret knowledge” to compensate for his physical inferiority. In that way, poison was seen as a less manly form of warfare.56
This consensus resulted in language forbidding
the use of biological and chemical weapons being inserted in the 1925 Geneva Protocol and is seen as the
reason why biological and chemical weapons were
never deployed during World War II. However, the
Geneva Protocol was not yet a robust tool for banning
the use of chemical weapons, since it banned only the
first use of biological weapons, without addressing the
problem of the acquisition of weapons. The document
also allowed for “reprisal in kind” if the state was attacked by another state using chemical weapons. At
the time of adoption, this concept was hotly debated.
In the words of Guillemin: “Ostensibly, it allowed
limited or symmetrical use of a prohibited weapon,
if it were undertaken to persuade an adversary using
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the weapon to stop. Whether reprisals in kind against
civilian populations fit this exception was a matter of
contention.”57 It thus represented a consensus regarding the development and stockpiling of biological and
chemical weapons but not regarding reprisal, retaliation, or justified first use.
However, despite the adoption of the Geneva
Protocol, many nations, including the United States,
began engaging in biological weapons research during World War II. In the late-1960s, however, nations
again began agitating for the creation of a ban on
biological weapons. The strong worldwide reaction
against the use of napalm in the Vietnam War is implicated in the passage of the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention.58 In this case, the public outcry was particularly strong regarding the deployment of chemical
weapons against civilians.
Thus, the passage of both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention can
be seen as the acknowledgement and codification of a
norm that was already existing and widely accepted,
rather than being attempts at establishing a consensus and building a norm. (Indeed, Guillemin notes
that even Hitler himself spoke out against the use of
chemical weapons.59) In each situation, the norm grew
organically from the bottom-up, rather than being imposed in a top-down fashion from an outside organization. The biological weapons example thus shows
that confidence-building measures can either recognize or codify a preexisting norm or work to establish
a norm. In the case of norms involving weapons, it
appears that confidence-building measures often rest
on a preexisting norm that the weapon itself—or its
modes of deployment—is both morally and ethically
problematic.
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However, one can also argue that those nations
that agreed to ban the production, stockpiling, and deployment of biological weapons did so not out of any
ethical or normative commitments, but rather due to
realpolitik. That is, states made a rational decision to
support a biological weapons ban due to the opportunity costs associated with the creation of these weapons; the uncertainties inherent in the development of
new technologies; and ultimately the possibility that
such weapons, once used, could easily spiral out of
control, inflicting potentially permanent damage to
the environment and population. Here, Mark Wheelis,
Lajos Rozsa, and Malcolm Dando argue that the tactical and strategic advantages of using biological and
chemical weapons are simply insufficient for the U.S.
military leadership to be fully committed to either the
development or deployment of these weapons. Thus,
they suggest that the United States has always done
just enough to be competitive in this field and not to
lose their advantage.60
Finally, in a situation where a strong international
preexisting norm against the deployment of a weapon
thus exists, we may expect that when a weapon is
deployed (or where there is a strong suspicion that a
weapon has been deployed), the force of international
public opinion will be strongly against the nation or
group suspected of deploying the weapon, regardless
of any justification which the actor might furnish. In
the words of Guillemin:
Unless a state can afford to retreat from world opinion, the use of chemical weapons identifies a user state
with a kind of ruthless barbarism, as it did when Iraq
used them against defenseless Iranian troops, including children, in the 1980s Iran-Iraq War.61
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Similarly, Richard Price refers to chemical weapons as “an object of special opprobrium.”62 In this
way, the international taboo against the use of biological weapons serves to dilute their military utility,
rendering them a less desirable and less effective form
of warfare.63
Wheelis, Rozsa, and Dando thus argue that the
main reason that the United States is not a powerhouse
in the deployment and manufacture of biological or
chemical weapons is simply because they do not want
to be, rather than because of either a strong system
of monitoring and verification restrictions that precludes doing so, or even out of a deep-seated ethical
and moral sense that it is improper to do so. They essentially state that the chemical and biological warfare
advocates never had the kind of leverage they needed
to develop an adequate biological weapons program.
The program was never a serious priority—advocates
of biological weapons tended to see their program in
isolation, not as a component within the entire weapons program. In addition, chemical and biological
weapons were never fully integrated into either military doctrine or forces. Military men generally did not
feel comfortable with these weapons.64
Thus, some analysts have suggested that it is not
confidence-building measures that have reigned in
the use of biological and chemical weapons in the 20th
and 21st centuries, but rather the strong ethical and
moral taboos that historically have accompanied the
deployment of these weapons.65 In addition, Guillemin
suggests that nations like the United States, France,
and Germany were willing to trade their interests in
manufacturing and deploying biological and chemical weapons in the 1970s because they possessed the
security of a nuclear umbrella. Thus, using biological
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and chemical was always less desirable when other
options were available.66 Reducing the supply of such
weapons is thus less problematic when there is already less demand for these weapons, for moral and
ethical reasons.
The question is thus whether we will ever see a
similar international consensus regarding the need for
a ban on the development, production, and deployment of cyber weapons, and whether states would
ever decide that it is not in their interest to develop
cyber weapons. If there does not exist a similar consensus regarding the immorality and undesirability of
using cyber weapons, can one be built? Here we can
point to, in more recent times, the passage of protocols
that would forbid the deployment of nuclear weapons
as well as current attempts to outlaw drones and other forms of autonomous killing. In each instance, the
introduction of new technologies led to a public conversation about the ethics and morality of a particular
new warfighting technology, from the introduction of
automatic weapons to the introduction of landmines
to the introduction of nanotechnology. That is, in
the immediate aftermath of the introduction of new
technology, there exists a window for the establishment of new norms regarding the deployment of that
technology, as well as for a public conversation that
might include scientists, weapons manufacturers, and
those who will eventually be responsible for its use.
It is thus not warfare itself with the new weapon that
leads to this conversation, but rather the introduction
of new technologies rendering the weapon possible
that does so.
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Thus, one may query whether it is useful to compare confidence-building measures against the use
of biological and chemical weapons with confidencebuilding measures against the use of cyber warfare
since, at least at present, there does not appear to be a
strong set of moral arguments against the deployment
of cyber weapons. The supply of such weapons is still
great, as is the demand for these weapons. Indeed,
those who create cyber weapons have made the argument that cyber weapons are actually more moral than
conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction, since they often only disrupt rather than destroy,
and it is not clear whether any specific deaths can be
attributed to cyber warfare alone in the present era. In
addition, there is no consensus among states regarding
the appropriate role or stance for government to take
in regulating the Internet at all, whether as a domestic
technology or an international vehicle. States differ in
their stances regarding issues like Internet censorship,
Internet surveillance, and pricing schemes for Internet
usage, including whether the state should subsidize
the costs of Internet usage. If states do not share a consensus regarding their stance toward the Internet as a
utility, can we also assume that this makes it unlikely
that states will share a consensus regarding the development and possible deployment of cyber weapons?
In addition, as Sofaer, Clark, and Diffie point out,
states may be less willing to cooperate and form regimes in order to eliminate a type of weaponry when
the technology that created the weaponry is still quite
new.67 Scientists and policymakers may feel that they
have not yet had sufficient time to explore the full capabilities of cyber weapons, both in an offensive and defensive capacity, and thus agreeing to limit their use at
this time is premature. Agreeing to limit their deploy-
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ment represents a risk since all parties are not entirely
sure at this stage what specific future utility they may
be agreeing to forego.68 In a situation where much of
the progress in this field will be made by commercial
actors, any moves to limit the development or deployment of these new technologies might also be seen as
a financial risk. Here we might consider, for example,
attempts by the European community to limit the
development of genetically engineered foods. While
policymakers may have felt that the risk posed by genetically modified organisms was sufficient to implement legislative controls on this technology, European
firms have complained that they are being placed at
a competitive disadvantage by being prevented from
engaging in research and development in this field
since other firms in other nations will continue to develop these technologies. They have also opposed the
fact that government entities are attempting to limit
current profits for the sake of limiting future risks.
Furthermore, neither the United States nor its adversaries (like China or Russia) seem to believe that
cyber warfare is a less desirable or second-best plan
of either offense or defense. States may be invested in
retaining arsenals of cyber weapons and may not see
any sort of ethical issues with doing so. Indeed, in his
work, Kirk Bansak argues that establishing regimes
that would disallow the use of one type of weapon
may actually backfire, creating unintended and unanticipated new scenarios. He argues that those who
seek, for example, to outlaw all use of biological weapons may actually be pushing both state and nonstate
actors who might have previously sought to use biological weapons to instead up the ante, choosing to
deploy yet a more deadly class of weapons, now that
the use of biological weapons is off the table.69 Thus,
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an attempt to ban the use of biological weapons might
cause an adversary to go nuclear, and an attempt to
ban cyber weapons might simply increase the likelihood of conventional warfare.
However, it is possible for a state to push for a ban
on the development of new weapons not because of
any implicitly ethical agenda, but rather for pragmatic
reasons. Thus, it has been suggested that the push
by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization states in
2011 for the formation of a set of norms governing cyber conflict arose not out of a genuine willingness to
reduce conflict in this area, but rather was part of a
realpolitik strategy. Worried that their nations could
not compete in a cyber arms race, the parties instead
chose to agitate in favor of ending such an arms race.
In doing so, they lessened their risk of defeat in an
arms race as well as their domestic costs of conducting
additional research and development.
While states may thus be pessimistic about either
the likelihood of a long-term ban on the development
of cyber weapons or the development of an ethic
against their use, it is still useful to think about the
ways in which verification and monitoring regimes
might be put into place in the area of cyber weaponry, again based on the example of biological and to a
lesser extent chemical weapons.
Provisions for Verification and Monitoring.
Like the territorial confidence-building measures
described earlier, the CBMs for biological weapons are
quite extensive. In the Seventh Review Conference on
the Biological Weapons Convention, which took place
in 2011, participants agreed to seven separate sets of
confidence-building measures.
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1. Exchange of data on research centers and
laboratories.
2. Exchange of information on national biological
defense research and development programs.
3. Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences.
4. Encouragement of publication of results and
promotion of use of knowledge.
5. Declaration of legislation, regulations, and other
measures.
6. Declaration of past activities in offensive and/
or defensive biological research and development
programs.
7. Declaration of vaccine production facilities.70
In this way, it becomes clear that the implementation of CBMs in this area cannot be carried out by one
agency alone but rather that it requires an interagency
effort on the federal, state and local levels. Regulating
biological and chemical weapons thus becomes a matter of international policy, as well as domestic policy.
Figure 6 provides a graphic representation of the
various social and political sectors involved in carrying out CBMs having to do with biological warfare. In
particular, Article IV of the Biological Weapons Treaty
requires states to adopt national measures that allow
them to comply with treaty provisions, including Article 1. However, the implementation of national or
domestic measures to uphold the provisions of the
Biological Weapons Treaty has occurred in an inconsistent manner among signatory nations.
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Sectors affected by domestic provisions of biological
weapons (BW)

• Environmental Legislation
• local, state level crisis management
• training in universities

• Homeland security
• military response
• training among professionals

Figure 6. Domestic Effects of Biological and
Toxic Weapons Convention.
The convention specifically allows states to choose
how to implement these national measures in accordance with their own forms of governments and constitutions. As such, implementation measures may include legislation, regulations, government decrees, or
administrative orders. In addition, the treaty requires
that states establish criminal penalties for those found
to be violating core provisions of Article 1 through,
for example, developing, producing, stockpiling, or
acquiring biological weapons.71 Again, these penal
sanctions may end up looking very different depending on the type of legal and governmental systems
in place within a particular nation. Here, the danger is that penalties might be applied and enforced
inconsistently.
In considering CBMs for cyber weapons acquisition and proliferation, we must consider how states
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can be encouraged to undertake domestic measures
to outlaw or regulate cyber weapons and how they
can encourage private sector actors to buy into these
processes. This would involve writing legislation
that would more tightly regulate the companies currently providing computer security, perhaps mandating them to provide and share information. (Many
industries currently do so voluntarily but the provision is inconsistent). In addition, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 requires all signatory states to the
Biological Weapons Convention to carry out domestic
measures (including surveillance) in order to prevent
the development and acquisition of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons by terrorists and nonstate
actors within their borders. This provision adds to the
domestic regulatory burden in this area, as states are
required to implement storage and reporting procedures for chemicals and equipment that can be used
in the manufacture of biological or chemical weapons.
They are also required to implement effective import
and export controls and operate stringent border controls to prevent the proliferation of these weapons of
mass destruction.72
Here the model provided in the areas of biological weapons surveillance provides best practices for
establishing surveillance and response procedures in
the areas of cyber weapons use and deployment. In
particular, biological weapons surveillance programs
like Biosense, Biowatch, and BioPhusion show that local, state, and national agencies, as well as the private
sector, can work together to monitor and provide guidance in situations where weapons use is suspected.73
As can be seen with the example of Biowatch, many of
the parties that are asked to abide by regulations and
contribute to goals regarding stemming the prolifera-
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tion or use of biological weapons are not government
employees, whether on the federal, state, or local level.
Instead, individuals and groups impacted by this legislation may include pharmaceutical companies, university laboratories, and hospitals. This complicates
the situation since undue government intervention
into the affairs of a private company and the affairs of
private individuals can easily be perceived as government overreach and such activities might even be described as unconstitutional. As a result, a regime has
evolved in which (at least in the United States) some
activities of parties affected by the domestic provisions
of the biological weapons regimes are undertaken on
a voluntary basis while others are undertaken due to
federal regulations that require subject’s compliance.
Another valuable lesson which those looking to
implement CBMs in regard to cyber warfare can draw
from an examination of biological warfare regimes is
in the area of socializing new scientists into the values
of an academic community. Under the provisions of
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, signatory states agree to implement procedures to raise
awareness of the prohibition against manufacturing
and developing biological weapons.74 As a result of
these provisions, U.S. scientific and research communities have implemented programs to socialize new
members of the academic community into the norms
and responsibilities, which they will bear as scientists
working within this field. Current U.S. standard operating procedures include requiring scientists and
others to undertake training on states’ criminal laws
banning biological weapons production and deployment and requiring scientists to adhere to a code of
conduct requiring them to refrain from working on
biological weapons.75 Thus, a scientist might par-
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ticipate in a workshop or conference regarding the
ethics of scientists working in the field of biological
weapons production voluntarily, while he might undertake other training that is mandated by his university as a condition of receiving U.S. Government
research funds.
The biological weapons CBMs thus clearly show
the role that the specialist community plays in carrying
out almost all of the activities agreed upon—including exchanging data about the existence of research
centers and labs; exchanging information on research
and development programs; exchanging information
on outbreaks, as well as in providing for the publication of results; and in declaring past activities. In each
instance, the specialized nature of the information to
be shared is specific enough that only scientists can
make the sorts of judgment calls that would be required, and for this reason, it is crucial that they share
an ethical stance regarding their work and that they
are committed to and engaged with the security issues
which can result from their work.
Here we can consider the ways in which the biological sciences community was involved in a series of
decisions that occurred in the early-2000s. A number
of advances in genetic engineering were determined to
have utility in the manufacture of new and potentially
more deadly viruses. In 2001, American scientists accidentally created a new and more deadly variant of
mouse pox while doing research on pest control. In
2002, scientists were able to create an artificial version of the polio virus that was found to have utility
to those engaged in biological warfare, and in 2002,
researchers were able to sequence DNA in order to
learn more about how smallpox works in the body. In
each instance, results were published publicly in aca-
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demic and mainstream science journals. Policymakers
criticized the editor’s decisions to publish this material, and the controversy led to a statement by a coalition of science and biology editors’ groups stating that
in the future, they would consider security issues in
deciding what information to publish.76
The lessons for the cyber community are clear.
Practitioners in the fields of cyber defense must develop an ethic regarding the value of their work and
its relation to national security. Specialists play a vital
role in self-policing, and it is one that cannot be duplicated by outside actors who do not possess the specialized knowledge that is needed to make judgment
calls regarding the implications of one’s work.
However, decisionmakers should be aware that
the sorts of domestic measures that might be undertaken to deal with either a biological or cyber weapons
incident within U.S. borders are likely to be perceived
by the press and the general public as problematic.
Preparing for a biological warfare event like a pandemic would likely involve the implementation of
measures such as mandatory vaccinations, the establishment of quarantines, and the establishment of
border controls—all of which could be described as
examples of government overreach and antidemocratic activities.77 Similarly, measures that might be
implemented in the area of cybersecurity would likely
look similar (including cutting off parts of the Internet
and requiring particular types of cyber hygiene) and
be met with similar resistance, even if they were implemented as part of an international treaty aimed at
securing these weapons. In each case, the government
action is aimed at containing a threat and preventing its escalation—each response requires multiple
actors working together on all levels of government,
including civilians.
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Addressing Suspected Violations of the Convention
and the International Response.
At the same time, the biological weapons ban did
not actually forbid all states from developing or even
deploying biological weapons. Rather, there were still
suspicions that many nations were continuing to engage in research in the field of biological weapons.
Thus, it is worth pointing out that many of the specific
provisions of the ban in the areas of verification and
monitoring are not viewed as robust within the international community. It is likely that similar problems
might arise were states to attempt to verify and monitor the implementation of regimes banning or controlling the development of cyber weapons.
Those that argue the attempts to outlaw the creation of biological weapons are doomed to failure and
traditionally have pointed to two specific cases: the
robust program of biological weapons research and
development carried out by the Soviet Union throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and the more recent case of
weapons treaty violations carried by the Iraqi government and the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)
verification mission in the 1990s. Each of these cases
points out specific limitations of a weapons treaty, and
each may hold lessons for those proposing to establish a similar set of verification regimes in the areas of
cyber weaponry.
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Case One: Biopreparat and the Former Soviet
Union.
In the late-1980s, the former Soviet government
admitted that it had maintained a large and vibrant biological weapons program since the 1960s. Jack Beard
argues that the Soviets “began cheating on the biological weapons regime less than a year after signing it.”78
Koblenz argues that the Soviet biological weapons
program can be compared to a covert activity occurring within a democratic society where even a nation’s
legally elected leaders might not be aware of all of the
details of a program. He describes Biopreparat as “a
deliberate maze of false front, secret projects and parallel organizations that often conducted both military
and peaceful research. The structure was designed to
enhance secrecy.”79
Full details of the project only came to light in
the late-1980s, and only because of a decision by the
new Russian leadership to provide details about activities that had occurred under the old Soviet regime,
and from which they now wished to distance themselves. Thus, the decision to share information with
the international community about treaty violations
was the result of domestic political factors and was
not the result of any treaty or verification and monitoring regime.
The Russian/Soviet example thus shows that international issues seldom occur in isolation. Rather,
transparency in the area of biological and chemical
weapons was finally achieved between the United
States and Russia not due to any official legislation,
but to domestic political developments and the developing relationship between the American and Russian
leaders. Thus, in considering America’s ability to establish bilateral and multilateral regimes to control the
50

manufacture, proliferation, and possible use of cyber
weapons with Russia, clearly the likelihood of success
or failure in this arena will depend on such factors as
the preexisting state of relations between the two nations in other areas, the amount of trust or suspicion
that exists between the two nations in relation to other
issues (such as Russia’s invasion of the Crimea, differences between the two nations regarding whether
or not to condemn the Assad regime, differences of
opinion regarding practices of Internet censorship
and policies on gay rights in the two nations) and the
personal relationships between the two leaders.80
Case Two: The United Nations Special Commission.
In 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the UN
established UNSCOM, which was tasked with investigating whether Saddam Hussein’s regime had
engaged in treaty violations in the area of biological
weapons. The commission, which lasted 7 years, has
been described as “the most intrusive arms control
regime ever devised,” since inspectors were able to
engage in unlimited aerial monitoring, to visit any site
anywhere in Iraq unannounced, to take photographs
and to ask questions of personnel. However, despite
the legal force and resources given to UNSCOM, Koblenz describes the initiative largely as failure, arguing that it was only when a high-ranking Iraqi official
defected in 1995 that inspectors actually received a
true picture of Iraq’s activities in these areas.81
Thus, one can argue that, regardless of how robust
a monitoring regime is, ultimately, intelligence activities will always be more effective than open monitoring, and states will always be able to elude detection
if they are committed to doing so. Those who point to
the failure of UNSCOM as an indictment of the futility
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of engaging in arms monitoring are likely to be similarly pessimistic about attempts to establish a monitoring regime for cyber weapons.
In her analysis of the failures of the Biological
Weapons Convention, Iris Hunger describes “transparency” as a concept which is too vague to be useful. She faults the writers of the convention who noted
that states needed to “keep the international community informed” of developments in key areas, but
stopped short of requiring that states report specific
numbers, such as how many doses of vaccine they
had prepared. It is this vagueness, she argues, that is
at the heart of the culture of rumors that exist within
the international community in relation to discussions
about biological and chemical weapons treaties and
supposed violations.82
However, a more serious concern (and one that
holds resonance for thinking through how these
provisions might work in the establishment of a cyberspace treaty) is that the states that have the most
serious problems with biological and chemical proliferation within their borders are also the most unstable nations, with weak structures of state authority
and poor mechanisms for enforcing any legislation
domestically. Nations like Syria and Libya are either
embroiled in or emerging from the chaos of civil war,
they often fall within the range of states described as
failed states, and their legal structures may be nearly
nonexistent. In such a situation, while a treaty may
mandate that states pass legislation regarding monitoring, punitive regimes, and reporting requirements,
it is doubtful that they will have the wherewithal to
seriously carry out such obligations either now or in
the near future.
Indeed, N. A. J. Taylor, Joseph Camilleri, and Michael Hamel-Green estimate that currently, eight Mid52

dle Eastern countries have a biological and chemical
weapon capability, along with a means of delivery.
Indeed, they describe the Middle East as the “poster
child” for the failure of global and regional non-proliferation efforts.83 Similarly, Hanis Haziqah, Md Hambali, Megan Hafizal, Megan Ramli, Noorliza Hamdan,
and Zalini Yunus point to the absence of an awareness
among scientists in Malaysia about the political and
ideological significance of their work, or the development of ethical thinking in this area.84
Figure 7 lays out some of the lessons that we
may thus draw from considering the enactment of
provisions for regulating the development, production and use of biological weapons through the
Biological Weapons Convention.
1. In the absence of a catalyzing event, the establishment of a normative
consensus or “taboo” regarding the creation of cyber weapons is unlikely.
2. As with biological weapons, the creators of CBMs for cyber weapons
will find it difficult to predict the types of weapons that might emerge in
the future or the issues associated with them. It becomes difficult to craft
a convention on future weaponry in light of this constraint.**
3. Prohibitions on the use of cyber weapons should not be considered in
isolation. By making access to one type of technology more difficult, an
adversary may simply be driven to utilize other means. Just as outlawing
biological weapons didn’t end conflict, outlawing or regulating the use of
cyber weapons may simply change the shape of conflict by making the
use of different weapons more likely.***
4. The development of confidence-building measures for preventing the
production, dissemination or use of biological weapons represents only
one stage of a larger program of defense in depth. The responsibilities for

Figure 7. Lessons from Confidence-Building
Measures in Biological Weapons.
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preventing outbreaks of deadly disease are dispersed among a variety
of actors throughout society – from individuals who are encouraged to
engage in public health measures like getting vaccines, to professional
organizations that offer training and monitoring, to the roles of states
and international organizations. Similarly, cybersecurity regimes include
a regard for cyber hygiene on an individual and corporate level, through
the activities of professional societies, up to and including the activities
of states.
5. Planners would do well to consider in advance the domestic implications of a cyber weapons regime – including the issues that arise in a
democratic society when precautionary or reactive measures are taken.
** These constraints are described in Casadevall, pp. 584-587.
*** This is the argument found in Bansak, pp. 66-76.

Figure 7. Lessons from Confidence-Building
Measures in Biological Weapons. (cont.)

PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CBMs
FOR CYBER WEAPONS
We can already identify many facets of weapons
control regimes that are being implemented or discussed in relation to cyber warfare. Figure 8 spells
out steps that have already been taken toward the
implementation of confidence-building measures in
cyberspace.
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1998:
• Russian Federation introduces draft resolution to UN, “Developments
in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of
international security.”
2000:
• Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation
recommends a multilateral treaty to deal with cybersecurity and proposes the creation of an international agency with regulatory authority.
2001:
• Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime includes provision that
signatory states establish a hotline for coordinating mutual responses,
provides for periodic consultations of parties.
• Russia proposes convening a UN group of governmental experts (GGE)
on developments in the field of information and communications.
2003:
• Publication of White House “National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.”
2004:
• First UN group of government experts (GGE) meets to talk about
threats in cyberspace. UN Secretary General admits in 2005 that no
consensus was reached.
2006:
• Joint Staff initiates efforts to develop a “National Military Strategy for
Cyberspace Operations.”
• U.S. Air Force initiates provisional Cyber command.

Figure 8. Timeline of Confidence-Building
Measures in Cyberspace.
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2007:
• Cyberattacks on Estonia.
2008:
• International Telecommunications Union convenes World Summit on
Information Society. Calls on ITU to facilitate the building of confidence
and security in the use of information and communications
technologies.
• NATO issues Draft Policy on Cyber Defense: creation of NATO”S Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC); Cyber Defense Management Authority (CDMA); NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of
Excellence.
• President Bush issues National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)
54, Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, and spelling
out role for Department of Homeland Security in defending domestic
national critical infrastructure.
• Cyber attacks occur as part of Russian-Georgian War.
2009:
• Russia creates agreement with Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) on sharing resources for information security.
• Rumored establishment of Russian “information troops.”
2010:
• Discovery of Stuxnet virus.
• U.S. Cyber Command is officially established.
2011:
• China, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan introduce draft UN General
Assembly Resolution, “an International Code of Conduct for Information Security.”

Figure 8. Timeline of Confidence-Building
Measures in Cyberspace. (cont.)
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• Russia publishes Convention on International Information Security.
2012:
• Publication of Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to
Cyber Warfare.
• United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research holds inaugural Cyber Security Conference on “The Role of Confidence-Building Measures
in Assuring Cyber Stability.”
2013:
• Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) publishes
initial set of confidence-building measures for cyberspace (Decision
1106), stressing that states should voluntary provide their views of
cyber warfare and meet voluntarily to reduce risks of misperception.
• U.S. and Russia agree on bilateral activities for confidence-building in
cyberspace, including a hotline between CERTs; direct communications
link between U.S. Department of State and Ministry of Defense in Moscow; direct communications link between U.S. Cybersecurity Coordinator and Russian Deputy Secretary of the Security Council; creation of a
bilateral working group on threats.
• United Nations group of government experts (UN GGE) proposes
recommendations for CBMs in cyberspace, including a larger role for
the UN in coordinating these measures. Members also voice agreement
on Seoul Framework, which states that international law does apply in
cyberspace.
• President Obama releases 2013 Cybersecurity Executive Order requiring the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to lead in
developing a cybersecurity framework of standards and best practices
for protecting critical infrastructure and directing regulatory agencies to
determine the adequacy of current requirements and their authority to
establish additional requirements to address risks.
2014:
•NIST Releases Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.0.

Figure 8. Timeline of Confidence-Building
Measures in Cyberspace. (cont.)
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CONCLUSION
As this report has shown, the development of confidence-building measures for the purposes of reducing cyber conflict is challenging. Because technology
in the field of cyber warfare is advancing rapidly and
in unpredictable ways, it is difficult to predict what
sorts of issues might arise in the future or what sorts
of measures might ultimately offer the most utility in
terms of stemming conflict. However, it is clear that at
the moment, there are certain elements in the field of
cyber warfare that are lacking and need to be created
and addressed prior to going forward.
First, the U.S. Government needs to take a leading role in starting a conversation about the ethics of
cyber warfare and cyber weapons. Such a conversation needs to include practitioners, ethicists, and academics, as well as military personnel. Practitioners
in particular need to be encouraged to think about
their own statement of purpose, or what it means to
be an individual or a community engaged in the production of new research in this field. Grants could be
provided for the writing and production of textbooks
in this area, and universities could be encouraged to
include conversations about cyber ethics in introductory and graduate-level engineering and computer
science courses.
Next, progress will not be made in the development of cyber confidence-building measures without
the active and prolonged engagement of practitioners
from academia and the private sector, as well as government. The issues are too complex for traditional
government administrators to ever satisfactorily
master on their own, and progress is advancing too
rapidly for anyone but a specialist to keep up.
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Finally, the U.S. Government, including the military, needs to decide consciously how committed they
are to the principle of transparency and information
sharing in this vitally important defense sector. Decisions regarding what information will be shared in the
future need to be made with a full awareness of both
the costs and benefits of agreeing to transparency.
Once these issues have been addressed, we might
envision a series of treaties that would lay out:
a. An agreement regarding the responsibilities
of all states to secure their own nation’s computer
systems. In the United States, policymakers have already created a voluntary agreement, which asks both
government agencies and private industries to: regularly file reports regarding the protocols they are using
to secure their systems, regularly run checks on their
own systems, and regularly participate in exercises to
make sure that they are not vulnerable. Commercial
sector responses are coordinated through the National
Institute for Standards and Technology’s Cyber Security Framework, while the responses of both public
and private sector actors concerned with critical infrastructure are coordinated through the Department
of Homeland Security’s Critical Infrastructure Cyber
Community C3 Voluntary Program.
Here, all parties rely on a shared understanding
of the norms of so-called “cyber hygiene,” which is
defined as:
steps that computer users can take to improve their
cybersecurity and better protect themselves online. It
may include reorganizing the IT infrastructure, hardware and devices; patching authorized software and
removing unauthorized software; continuous monitoring, training and awareness; and formalizing existing informal information security controls.85
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b. An agreement requiring states to provide notification of incursions detected into their system
and sharing of that information with others through
their nation’s Computer Emergency Response Teams
(CERTs). Here, protocols might resemble those that
national organizations like the U.S. Center for Disease
Control follow in sharing information about unusual
disease outbreaks with the World Health Organization. Here the question may be how much information national CERTs and computer security incident
response teams are willing to share with international
contacts, including adversaries, and what the security risks to their own infrastructure might be from
sharing this information.
c. Establishment of an agreement that ranked and
classified cyber weapons86 and the establishment of
a standard for what it might mean to be “adequately
prepared” to wage cyber warfare—or what an adequate number and variety of cyber weapons might
be. Here the involvement of specialists will be key, and
the resulting decisions may again end up resembling
those undertaken by virologists and epidemiologists
who have created systems for classifying types of biological weapons. The biological weapons community
relies here on the criteria developed by the U.S. Army
in 1964, as well as the Critical Agent List, which is organized and disseminated by the Centers for Disease
Control. This list provides a starting point for assessing dual-use technologies through classifying which
diseases present the greatest threat and thus require
the continual development of new responses. In addition, it provides the basis for the granting of clearances to researchers working in this field.87
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d. An agreement regarding ethical standards for
the cyber community that would spell out which
methods of propagation and types of cyber weapons were viewed as either morally or legally unacceptable. Here, the U.S. Government should commit
resources to the development of an ethical and professional society for those who work in the field of
computer science. The goal should be the creation of a
set of ethical standards, which researchers in this field
might commit to and share, and which would cause
them to define certain activities (such as the creation of
malicious code) as contrary to the spirit of the profession. Here, one can consider the codes of ethics which
the Society of Professional Journalists or the American
Society for Public Administration have adopted as
a model.
The challenges will come from the fact that the
so-called “hacker code of ethics” already exists and is
widely shared by those who work in this field. However, the hacker code includes provisions that are at
odds with U.S. national security interests—with its
libertarian ethic of making information as free and
widely available as possible, along with its resistance
to practices of surveillance. Currently, it is difficult to
see how a hacker code and an ethics code that has security at its core could be reconciled, but establishing
a conference for the establishment of a code of ethics, along with furnishing grants to those who study
ethics, might provide a valuable starting point.
Clearly, the shared understanding among biologists that “those who work in the life sciences do not
create agents of death” has been a compelling and
necessary underpinning for the self-policing of the
organization by its members. This understanding is
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not merely American, but nearly universal among
biologists and for this reason, a true international
epistemic community can be said to exist. This has
helped to guide scientific developments in this field
and provides a valuable hedge against the development of biological and chemical weapons. Similarly,
a practitioner’s group in the field of computer science
might play this field if they were supported in efforts
to create conferences, research and a journal of cyber
warfare ethics.
e. Establishment of specific parameters requiring
the reporting of research advances, and the establishment of standards regulating the types of cyber
warfare exercises that would be permitted both by
military and civilian (private sector) practitioners.
As noted earlier, the involvement of specialists themselves will be key in establishing joint understandings
regarding how and when information about security
vulnerabilities and new methods of both offensive
and cyber warfare will be shared. In time, the cyber
community may decide, as the biological research
community has, that some types of information are
too dangerous to be reported in regular academic
channels in open source journals and websites. Similarly, practitioners themselves will likely have to decide what types of hacking exercises and targets are
appropriate for training purposes and which are not.
Here, the U.S. Government can likely be of assistance
but is unlikely to be the main driving force in making
these decisions.
f. Annual reporting. In the area of biological weapons, the U.S. State Department issues an annual compliance report to Congress that reports on its own ac-
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tivities, as well as those observed in other countries.88
Here, it is likely that a body like the National Institute
on Standards and Technology or the Department of
Homeland Security might be tasked with reporting
on the state of U.S. cyber hygiene in both the private
and public sectors, as well as calling attention to any
new developments in the fields of cyber warfare that
would be of interest to Congress for the purposes of
regulation and oversight.
As this report has shown, an ethic regarding the
utility of these weapons and a shared understanding of transparency will not develop overnight. In
addition, these concerns will never be divorced from
other concerns, including domestic political concerns,
relationships between actors in the international system, and other types of military decisions regarding
warfare. However, progress is possible. Establishing
a shared ethic and set of norms will be a valuable
first step.
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